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Confusing Memories for Verbal and Nonverbal Communication 
Paula T. Hertel and Alice Narvaez 
Trinity University 
Emotion portrayed nonverbally in videotaped conversations impaired memory for the specific meaning 
of utterances. Subjects produced more recognition (Experiment I) or recall (Experiment 2) errors 
that were consistent with the emotional versions they had viewed than errors reflecting other emotions. 
ln Experiment 1, this effect on recognition memory depended neither on the type of orienting task 
for nonverbal behaviors (attention to surface characteristics vs. interpretations} nor on the length of 
the retention interval. In Experiment 2, the number of emotional errors in recall was slightly dependent 
on the reported moods of the viewers. These and other outcomes suggest that emotional interpretations 
of the nonverbal behaviors of others are associated in memory with the meaning of utterances. We 
discuss the results in reference to the effects of misleading information and to models of mood and 
memory. 
An interviewer might note, we are warned, that the candidate 
who mumbles replies is lacking in confidence. Similarly, a ther­
apist might observe that the crossed arms of a client indicate an 
unwillingness to be known. Popularized notions such as these­
some supported by research in nonverbal communication-im­
ply that nonverbal behaviors are interpreted along emotional di­
mensions and that the behaviors and/or their interpretations are 
represented in memory. The purpose of the research we describe 
here was to discover if interpretations of emotion based on non­
verbal behaviors influence memory for conversational utterances. 
A probable consequence of storing representations of these in­
terpretations is that they will be available later, when someone 
is attempting to remember the content of a conversation. In trying 
to remember our conversations, then, our listeners may retrieve 
the emotion portrayed by our nonverbal behaviors, as well as the 
verbally expressed meaning of our utterances. Consequently, 
they may simply confuse what we have said with how we have 
said it. 
The idea that people remember the emotional context of con­
versational utterances, perhaps to the detriment of memory for 
their individual meanings, is analogous to the well-established 
finding that people remember the meaning of sentences at the 
expense of remembering surface form (e.g., Sachs, 1967). In 
Sachs's experiment, for example, prose passages were followed 
by recognition items that either reproduced a passage sentence, 
changed the meaning of that sentence, or changed the surface 
form while preserving the meaning. Changes in meaning were 
Experiment 1 was conducted as the second author's senior honors thesis. 
We are grateful to Susan Shackelford for assisting with data collection 
in Experiment 2 and to the drama and psychology students who directed 
and acted in the scenes, especially Andrea LeHaye and Barbara Spezia. 
Ralph Geiselman, Larry Jacoby, Marcia Johnson, and two anonymous 
reviewers provided very helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
article; we thank them. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paula 
Hertel, Department of Psychology, Trinity University, 715 Stadium Drive, 
San Antonio, Texas 78284. 
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recognized much more frequently than were changes in surface 
form. 
In our view, investigating memory for sentences in the context 
of prose passages can be extended to investigating memory for 
sentences in the context of conversation, rich with added mean­
ings from nonverbal behaviors. Now, if emotion depicted in con­
versation occupies a superordinate position with respect to in­
dividual sentence meaning (as does the gist of a passage), we 
should expect to find that changes in �motional meaning would 
be recognized more frequently than changes in wording that re­
flect the emotional meaning of the conversation, and that emo­
tionally tinged elaborations are produced during recall. 
Investigators report in the nonverbal communication literature 
that emotion can be recognized in facial expressions (e.g., Frijda, 
1969), gestures (e.g., Gitin, 1970), posture (e.g., Rosenberg & 
Langer, !965), and tone of voice (e.g., Davitz, 1964; Kramer, 
1963). Yet scant evidence can be found for confusions in memory 
for the content of verbal and nonverbal communication. Gei­
selman and his colleagues (Geiselman & Bel1ezza, !977; Gei­
selman & Crawley, 1983) have interpreted incidental memory 
for the voice of the speaker from an interactive perspective. They 
suggest that connotations implied by vocal tone elaborate the 
meaning of spoken sentences. In contrast, we were interested in 
incidental memory for what was said and how it might be affected 
by such nonverbal factors as vocal tone (how it was said). Ac­
cordingly, we videotaped three scenes, each from two different 
emotional perspectives. Only the nonverbal behaviors varied be­
tween the versions of each scene and conformed to the emotions 
we wished to portray. 
In Experiment I, we examined confusions displayed in a 
forced-choice recognition task, following two types of orienting 
tasks that directed attention to nonverbal behaviors: a task that 
emphasized the surface characteristics of gestures and vocal tone 
and a task that encouraged interpretations of emotions. These 
tasks very roughly correspond to orienting tasks for verbal ma­
terial that call attention to its surface features or to its meaning 
(cf.Craik& Lockhart, 1972).Comparedto surface tasks,semantic 
tasks have more in common with the cognitive demands of recall 
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and recognition and therefore produce better memory perfor­
mance (Bransford, Franks, Morris, & Stein, 1979). In borrowing 
this distinction, we intended to examine the necessary conditions 
for encoding meaning from nonverbal behaviors in such a way 
that it might be confused in memory with the meaning of dia­
logue. Is it necessary to consciously or effortfully interpret tone 
of voice and gestures-the whine and wringing of hands, for 
example-or is it sufficient merely to notice them while extracting 
meaning from dialogue? The conscious interpretation of emotion 
might be necessary to establish a record in memory that could 
be easily accessed during recall or recognition. On the other hand, 
encoding the meaning of dialogue is typically an effortless task, 
and it produces memories that are often easily retrieved. Perhaps 
we are equally skilled in extracting emotional meaning from 
nonverbal behaviors without intending to think about their sig­
nificance. 
In Experiment 1, then, subjects either attended to the surface 
characteristics of nonverbal behavior or interpreted the emotions 
they portrayed. Because Sachs (1967) found that confusions be­
tween semantically similar sentences increased with delay in 
testing, we wondered if confusions along an emotional dimension 
might also increase with time. So we varied the retention interval 
by testing immediately, or after one week. In printed recognition 
tests, 1 we presented target utterances along with distractors that 
were emotionally consistent or inconsistent with the videotaped 
version, or emotionally irrelevant. In addition, we assessed rec­
ognition of the surface form of utterances by including surface 
distractors. A few studies suggest that memory for surface form 
in conversation is unusually good (e.g., Keenan, MacWhinney, 
& Mayhew, 1977; Kintsch & Bates, 1977) compared to memory 
for the surface form of written or spoken discourse (e.g., Sachs, 
1967}. A subsidiary aim, then, was to determine the possible 
influence of nonverbally portrayed emotion on recognition of 
surface form. 
In Experiment 2, we employed cued-recall procedures in order 
to explore the relation between viewers' moods and their ten­
dencies to erroneously remember emotion in utterances. Recent 
investigaiions of mood and memory (e.g., Boggiano & Hertel, 
1983; Bower, 1981; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Teasdale 
& Fogarty, 1979) have indicated that errors in memory perfor­
mance are qualitatively similar to the mood of the subject. Here, 
we were concerned with the possibility that the subjects' natural 
moods might either ameliorate or confuse the effects of actors' 
moods on memory for their utterances. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Materials. Each of three short scenes was videotaped twice, from 
two different emotional perspectives. The restaurant scene depicted a 
woman's reaction of disgust or interest in hearing her friend's tale of 
infidelity. In the classroom scene, a girl expressed joy or fear about going 
away to college to her friend across the aisle. And in the telephone scene, 
a woman expressed anger or distress in discovering that she had just been 
robbed. The two versions of each scene contained the same dialogue and 
differed only in the nonverbal behaviors of vocal tone, body posture, 
gestures, and facial expressions that the actors displayed. 
In order to validate the two emotional perspectives, 12 pilot subjects 
saw one version of each scene or read written transcripts of the conver­
sation. Their task was to pick from a list of adjectives (Plutchik, 1980, 
p. 166) five that seemed to best characterize the primary actor. Adjectives 
that were selected four or more times for any scene served as the criterion 
for evaluating perceived emotion. Subjects who saw Version I of the res­
taurant scene (disgust) chose annoyed, disgusted, displeased, and irritaLed. 
In contrast, the adjectives for those subjects who saw Version 2 (interest) 
were amused, curious, fasr:inaLed. and interested. For the classroom scene, 
subjects who saw Version I Uoy) chose the adjectives delighted, elated. 
excited, happy. joyful, proud, and self-satisfied, whereas the adjectives 
anxious, confo.sed, fearful, insecure, and nervous were selected by those 
who viewed Version 2 (fear). Finally, for Version 2 of the telephone scene 
(anger) the adjectives angry. annoyed, disgusted, irritated, and upset were 
chosen, whereas for Version I (distress), subjects chose the adjectives 
anxious, depressed, distressed. and upset. Individual subjects who read 
the written transcript of each scene made selections quite similar to those 
just described. However, u a group, their selections did not reflect the 
consistency of the results from the videotaped versions. For example, 
choices for the transcript of the restaurant scene included displeased as 
frequently as curious (3 subjects each). 
In a second pilot task, subjects used a 7-point scale from not at all to 
extremely to respond to questions about the emotional state of the primary 
actor in each scene (e.g., "How fearful did the student seem about going 
away to college?"). The median ratings by subjects who viewed the vid­
eotapes were consistent with the particular versions they had viewed (ie., 
close to not at all by those who saw the joy version, and close to extremely 
for those who saw the fear version). Median ratings by subjects who read 
the transcript were in the neutral range. This ordering of median ratings 
occurred for 10 of the 12 questions. 
In Experiment I, the forced-choice test for each scene consisted of six 
items containing four alternatives. The first two items were filler items. 
(Data for these items were not included in analyses.) The remaining four 
items contained the following alternatives: the target (the actual utterance 
that occurred in the scene), a surface distractor (an utterance in which 
the exact wording of the target was changed, but the meaning was pre­
served), an emotional distractor (an utterance in which the surface form 
of the target remained mostly intact but the meaning was changed slightly 
by incorporating words or phrases that express emotion), and a surface/ 
emotional distractor (an utterance in which the previous surface and 
emotional distractors were combined). We included the last category to 
prevent subjects from adq,ting a test strategy of eliminating the one 
alternative out of the previous three that was most dissimilar. Hereafter, 
we refer to these last two categories of alternatives as emotional distractors. 
The type of emotional distractors varied across items for all of the 
subjects. Two items contained distractors that reflected the emotion por­
trayed in Version I of the scenes, and two items reflected Version 2 (see 
Table I for examples}. Thus, the recognition test presented two items 
with emotional distractors that were consistent with the version of the 
scene each subject had viewed and two items with emotional distractors 
that were inconsistent.11\vo forms of each test were constructed in order 
1 In constructing these tests, an important consideration was the dif­
ference between study and test modalities (audio/video vs. print). Perhaps 
a clearer demonstration of confusions would result from recognition al­
ternatives presented in the audio or audio/video mode(s). However, in 
considering this procedure we were faced with the difficulty of holding 
voice tone, phrasing, and perhaps other nonverbal behaviors constant 
across· target and distractors. Moreover, the inclusion of inconsistent 
emotional distractors seemed ludicrous (if nonverbal behaviors were held 
constant) or trivial (if they varied). And it seemed to us that tests for 
remembering in natural contexts would rarely take the form of instant 
replays. 
2 In order to mask the nature of the experimental hypothesis, the first 
two items on the test (the filler items) included emotionally irrelevant 
distractors, rather than emotional distractors. In one item, for example, 
we changed 6 months to 8 months. In another item, we changed a name. 
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Table I 
Examples of Recognition Alternatives 
Type of distractor Example 
Restaurant scene 
Target I don't know. I wouldn't want to be in your position. 
Surface distractor 
Disgust distractor 
Surface/disgust 
Interest distractor 
Surface/interest 
I have no idea. I wouldn't want to be in your situation. 
I don't know. I would never be in your position. 
I have no idea. I would never be in your situation. 
I don't know. But I'd love to be in your position. 
I have no idea. But I'd love to be in your situation. 
Classroom scene 
Target 
Surface distractor 
Joy distractor 
Surface/joy 
I think it's going to be a big change. It's so far away. I won't have my family around. 
I think it wiU be a big change. It's so far away. My family won't be around. 
I'm glad it's going to be a big change. It's very far away. I won't have my family around. 
I'm glad it will be a big change. It's very far away. My family won't be around. 
Fear distractor 
Surface/fear 
I'm afraid it's going to be a big change. It's too far away. I won't have my family around. 
I'm afraid it will be a big change. It's too far away. My family won't be around. 
to vary the type of emotional distractor for each item. Across subjects, 
therefore, each target was judged in the context of both types of emotional 
distractors. The order of the alternatives within each item was randomly 
assigned and was identical for both forms. Item order conformed to ut­
terance order in the scripts. 
Design. A mixed design factorially combined three between-subjects 
factors (orienting task, retention interval, and version), with scene and 
type of emotional distractor (emotional alternatives that were either con­
sistent or inconsistent with the version viewed) as ...  1thin�ubjects factors. 
In the surface task, the subjects recorded the frequencies of specific ges.. 
tures, whereas in the interpretation task the subjects rated discrepancies 
between vocal tone and posture in communicating attitude. The retention 
interval was either approximately 5 min or 1 week. Half of the subjects 
saw Version I of all three scenes ("disgust" for the restaurant scene, "joy" 
for the classroom scene, and "distress" for the telephone scene); the other 
half saw Version 2 ("interest," "fear," and "anger," respectively). The order 
of the scenes {telephone, restaurant, classroom; classroom, telephone, 
restaurant; or restaurant, classroom, telephone) and the form of the rec­
ognition test were counterbalanced within conditions of orienting task, 
retention inten'al, and version. 
Subjects. A total of 105 undergraduate students at Trinity University 
volunteered as subjects in order to receive credit in an introductory psy­
chology course. Groups of 3-5 subjects were randomly assigned to each 
of the eight combinations of orienting task, retention interval, and version. 
Three subjects failed to return for the second session; so, in order to 
control for this self-selection factor and to establish appr()Jlriate coun­
terbalancing, the data from 6 subjects were randomly eliminated, with 
the constraint that no fewer than I 2 subjects remained per condition and 
equal numbers saw the scene$ in each order and took each form of the 
recognition test The data from 96 subjects were analyzed. 
Procedure. When subjects arrived for t� first session of the experi­
ment, the experimenter told them that they had volunteered for a pilot 
study on the social psychology of conversation. Then, the subjects in the 
surface-processing condition were told that the purpose of the study was 
to insure that three videotaped scenes contained an adequate number of 
noticeable body movements and to estimate vocal pitch. Their task. was 
to focus on a specific body movement of the primary actor in each soene 
and to record its frequency (bead nodding by the listener in the restaurant 
scene, hand movements by the student who got accepted to college, and 
eye movements in the telephone scene). frequencie$ were recorded on 
paper, but subjects were required to keep their eyes on the videotape. 
The experimenter encouraged them to listen to the conversation and 
mentioned that they would later rate their interest in each soene and 
write a short description of its topic. 
Foliowing eacll soene, subjects rated the overall pitch of the primary 
actor's tone of voice from low (I) to high (7) and their interest in the' 
scene from not at all inJerested (I) to very interested (7). Last, they wrote 
short descriptions of the scene's t()Jlic. The purpose of the interest-rating 
and describing tasks was to insure attention to the dialogue, in addition 
to the nonverbal behaviors. 
The subjects who were required to interpret nonverbal behaviors were 
led to believe that the purpose of the pilot study was to investigate judg­
ments about vocal tone and body posture. Their first task was to judge 
whether the primary actor's tone of voice lit with her body posture in 
communicating her attitude. This judgment was made on a scale that 
ranged frum not discrepant (J) to discrepanJ (7). Then, a second taslc 
required that they choose five adjective$ that described the primary actor's 
attitude as expressed by vocal tone and body posture only. Both tasks 
were designed to instigate careful attention to the emotional meaning of 
nonverbal behaviors, in contraSt to the taskJI of rating pitch and counting 
movements. These tasks followed the showing of ea<:h scene and were, in 
tum, foliowed by the interest-rating and description tasks. 
After all of the tasks were completed, the experimenter dismissed the 
subjects who were to be tested one week later and told them that they 
would judge additional scene$ when they returned. No mention of the 
memory test was made. The subjects who were tested in the first session 
were required to return in one weelc, but only to receive credit for their 
participation.' Immediately prior to testing, all of the subjects were told 
that an additional purpose of the experiment was to examine memory 
for the dialogue. All of the recognition tests (one for each scene, taken 
consecutively) were self-paced, and their order conformed to the order 
in which the scenes had been shown. Each test began with instructions 
to choose the alternatives that the subjects believed occurred in the vid­
eotape. Thsting procedures ·were identical for both retention intervals. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 2 reports the mean proportion of choices for targets, 
surface-form distractors, and emotional distractors in both testing 
conditions and according to the nature of the emotional dis­
tractors (consistent and inconsistent). Due to the lack of inde­
pendence among these choices, the overall design was not sub­
mitted to analysis. However, it is quite clear that the proportion 
3 This procedure addressed the potential confound of self-selection in 
the delayed condition on the basis of rate of return. 
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Table 2 
Mean Proportion of Recognition Responses 
Type of emotional distractor 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Response choice Immediate Delay Immediate Delay 
Target .59 .46 .65 .52 
Surface distractors .20 .23 .22 .27 
Emotiona.l distractors .21 .32 .13 .20 
Note. n � 48. The data are collapsed across the type of orienting task 
because it failed to produce reliable differences. 
of target choices was larger than what one would expect from 
chance performance (.25), even after one week. Again, conver­
sation memory was unusually accurate (cf. .Keenan et al., 1977; 
Kintsch & Bates, 1977). 
Separate analyses were performed for the number of emotional 
errors and tile proportion of target choices when meaning was 
recognized (recognition of surface form). Following the sugges.. 
tions of McCall and Appelbaum ( 1973), we employed a multi­
variate approach in evaluating effects involving the within-sub­
jects factors and report approximate univariate Fs for Wilks's 
lambda criteria. Alpha was set at .05 for all analyses. 
.Enwtional errors. In order to evaluate the nu mber of emo­
tional errors in recognition memory, we performed a mixed­
design analysis of variance (ANOVA), with orienting task, retention 
interval, and venion as between-subjects factors, and scene and 
the type of emotional distractor (consistent versus inwnsistent) 
as within-subjects factors. First, the type of orienting task for 
nonverbal behaviors did not affect the number of emotional er­
rors, either alone or interactively. This finding suggests that con­
scious attention to the emotional meaning of nonverbal behaviors 
was not a necessary prerequisite for confusions and that merely 
attending to these behaviors in the context of processing dialogue 
was sufficient. 
Overall, more emotional errors occurred when the test was 
delayed than when it immediately followed the viewing, F(l, 
88) = 12.78, MSe = .367. However, the length of the retention 
interval did not interact with other factors. Although the number 
of consistent emotional errors increased over the retention in­
terval, for example, so did the number of inconsistent errors. 
Thus, our subjects tended to forget the meaning of utterances 
over time, but they were not increasingly influenced by the non­
verbal context 
Most important, recognition of the correct meaning of utter­
ances was affected by nonverbally communicated emotion. More 
emotional errors occurred when the distractors were emotionally 
consistent than when they were inconsistent, F(l, 88) = 18.43, 
MS. = .295. However, this effect jointly depended on the par­
ticular scene and version on which the errors were based. F == 
4.36. Table 3 reports the mean number of consistent and incon­
sistent errors for each version of each scene. The three-way in­
teraction of type, scene, and version was evaluated by examining 
the simple main effect of distractor type within each of the specific 
versions. Three versions (disgust, fear, distress) produced reliable 
differences between consistent and inconsistent errors (disgust, 
F{l, 44)= 4.98,MSe = .706; fear, F(l, 44) = l5.38,MS. = .847; 
listress, .F(l, 44) = 4.10, MS.= .731). Although the difference 
or the joy version was not statistically reliable, it was in the 
tppropriate direction. 
These differences indicate that changes in emotional meaning 
were recognized more frequently than changes that preserve that 
meaning, but only under some conversational conditions. This 
restriction is not surprising if we consider the large number of 
'actors that t1Ught operate in memory for conversations and the 
:tifficulty of holding them constant across our materials. One 
>bvious factor is the match between recognition alternatives and 
tctual interpretations of emotion portrayed in any particular 
tersion. Another factor, of course, is the ability of our actors to 
:xpress the desired emotions nonverbally. ln particular, the sub-
jects commented during their final debriefing that the woman 
in the telephone scene did not seem at all angry. 
Finally, a reliable main effect of scene also occurred, F = 4.16, 
with the classroom scene producing the most errors. 
Memory for surfacejOrm. Because the large number of target 
choices showed that the surface form of the dialogue was well 
recognized, we wished first to determine the degree of surface 
memory, unencumbered by the influence of emotion, and then 
to determine if it had been affected by the type of emotion dis­
played nonverbally or described by the emotional dis tractors. To 
obtain a measure of surface recognition that was independent 
of emotional confusions in memory, we determined the propor­
tion of target choices out of semantically correct cho ices (taJ'8et 
plus surface distra<..'tor) for each subject and then submitted these 
proportions to an ANOVA. The size of th is proportion decreased 
over the retention interval, although not quite to chance l evels 
of responding (immediate, .71; delayed, .60), P(l, 88) = 11.41, 
MS. = .166. Jn addition, the proportion of target choices varied 
across scenes, F = 8. 70. No other reliable difference was observed. 
Although we had suspected that memory for the surface form 
of utterances might be influenced by the type of emotional dis­
tractor (better without the distraction provided by emotionally 
consistent distractors), this was not the case. 
Experiment 2 
Mood effects in memory are often found with recall procedures 
but are rarely obtained in recognition (but see Leight & Ellis, 
1981, for an exception). Therefore, we changed the testing pro­
cedure in Experiment 2 to cued recall in order to examine the 
Table 3 
Mean Number of Emotional Errors in Recognition 
Scene and version 
Restaurant 
Version I: Disgust 
Version 2: Interest 
Classroom 
Version I: Joy 
Version 2: Fear 
Telephone 
Version I: Distress 
Version 2: Anger 
Type of emotional distractor 
Consistent 
0.48 
0.33 
0.53 
0.77 
0.60 
0.46 
Inconsistent 
0.21 
0.33 
0.37 
0.25 
0.35 
0.46 
Note. 11 .. 48. Two errors of each type were possible. 
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possible interaction of subjects' and actors' moods in determining 
emotional errors in memory. We assessed moods at the start of 
the session with a mood checklist, presented in a deceptive fashion 
that, according to the subjects' reports, seemed believable. The 
experimenter told the subjects that the Psychology Department 
was interested in the moods of students who partidpate in re­
search. 
rn addition to our interest in mood, we were somewhat con· 
cerned that when we provided emotional recognition alternatives 
in the previous experiment we encouraged the subjects to make 
emotional errors that they might not have made without the 
emot ional cues. Such cues were eliminated by our recall pro­
cedures. 
The design of Experiment 2 also included a control condition 
in which subjects read transcripts of the scenes. The results of 
our pilot study indicated that subjects could infer emotiona\ in­
tent of the primary actors after reading transcripts of the scenes 
when they were asked to do so (although the nature of these 
inferences varied a great deal). This is not surprising, given that 
we wrote scenes that would lend themselves to interpretations 
consistent with the emotions we wished to vary. However, our 
interest in Experiment 2 was in whether these interpretations 
might occur spontaneously (unrequested) and affect recall in the 
same manner as emotion inferred from videotaped behaviors. 
Method 
AI the besinning of the sessions, the experimenter distributed copies 
of a mood clteclclist. This cltecldist rontained one of two randomly ordered 
lists of 2 I emot ional words, each followed by a 7-point rating scale an­
chored by not aJ all and extremely. The list was compiled by selecting 
the three most frequent descriptors used by pilot subjects for each vciSion 
of each sce ne and adding three additional words that were less frequently 
chosen (annoyed. disgustec(. displeased, irritated. amused, curious. inter­
ested, excited. happy, joyful, confused.fearful. insecure. anxious. depressed. 
distre1.·sed, angry, upset, confident. nervous, a.nd tired). Subjects were in­
structed to indicate their current moods under the cover that the psy­
cbology department was interested in the mood of subjects who participate 
in experiments. Then, the conversations from the previous experiment 
were presented in one of three conditions: Version 1 of the three scenes, 
Versioo 2 of the three scenes, or transcripts of the three scenes. Eighteen 
subjects were randomly assisned to each condition. Three ordeiS of the 
scenes were counterbalanced within these acquisitioo conditions. We in­
structed subjects in all conditions to read or to attend to the scenes; 
questions would follow. These brief instructions were us.;d in order to 
make the instructions consistent across all versioos, including the tran­
scripts. 
Following a 2-min interval, forms for the recall task were distributed. 
Four questions about the conversation in each scene were listed on one 
page, in the order corresponding to conversational order. (Examples are 
presented in the Appendix.) The instructions emphasized memory tor 
utterances, rather than interptetations, but exact wording was not required 
The subjects answered the quest ions for each scene in turn, with the order 
of the scenes preserved. 
During debriefing, we solid ted remarks about our attempts to deceive 
them about the purpose of the mood ratings, and we requested written 
self-reports on the judged source of emotion (verbal or nonverbal) present 
in the scenes. 
Results and Discussion 
Emotional e"ors. Two judges, blind to acquisition conditions, 
independently categorized each response to each question as 
Table 4 
Mean Number of Emotional Errors In Cued Recall 
Acquisition condition 
Scene and version Version I Version 2 Transcript 
Restaurant 
Version I: Disgust 0.89 0.39 0.39 
Version 2: Interest 0.00 0.28 0.39 
Classroom 
Version I: Joy 1.11 0.00 0.89 
Ve-rsion 2: Fear 0.00 1.39 0.44 
Note. n = 18. 
containing no emotional errors or emotional errors reflecting 
either Version 1 or Version 2. Their judgments were based on 
deviations from the transcript that corresponded to each emotion 
portrayed on the videotape. (Comments about the mood of the 
actors were not considered to be emotional errors; they rarely 
occurred. ) They disagreed about 4% of the responses, and then 
resolved those differences. 
Table 4 presents the mean number of emotional errors of each 
type for each version oft wo scenes. (The results for the telephone 
scene arc ignored inasmuch as very few emotional errors ob­
tained, M = .05.) Most obviously, no emotional errors corre­
sponding to the opposite version of the classroom scen e were 
made by subjects who viewed the videotapes. This was also true 
for tha5e who viewed Version 1 of the restaurant scene. Conse­
quently, we analyzed the number of errors consistent with each 
version, comparing the videotape condition to the transcript 
condition. Subjects who viewed Version I of the restaurant scene 
(disgust) produced more emotional errors than did those who 
read the transcript, F(I, 51)"" 4.21, MS.= .712. Similarly, Ver· 
sion 2 of the classroom scene (fear) produced more errors than 
did the transcript, F(l, 34) = 13.17, MS.= .609. Although the 
mean difference in errors consisteni with Version l of the class­
room scene (joy) was in the right direction (Version 1 vs. tran· 
script), it was not reliable. Finally, the effect was not obtained 
tor Version 2 of the restaurant scene (interest). In summary, all 
of the subjects who saw the videotapes produced more emotional 
errors that were consistent with the versions they had viewed 
than errors corresponding to the other versions. Moreover, for 
two types of emotional errors (disgust and fear) the videotapes 
produced reliably more errors than did the transcripts.4 
Recall accuracy. Our judges scored responses to each question 
for the number of propositions or idea units correctly recalled. 
("I think it's going to be a big change" contains three propositions: 
{a) it will be a change, (b) the change is big, and (c) I think {that 
a and b are true].) They disagreed about 8% of the responses 
�d resolved their differences. These numbers were then summed 
across all items in each scene and converted into a proportion 
of the total number of propositions in the scene. Table 5 reports 
the mean proportion of propositions recal.led in each acquisition 
condition and scene. When these proportions were analyzed ac­
cording to acqvisition condition, scene, and version, we found 
• Also, note that subjects who read transcripts made emotional errors 
that did not reliably d iffer according to the type of emotion. 
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Table 5 
Mean Proportion of Propositions Recalled 
Acquisition condition 
Version I 
Version 2 
Transcript 
Note. n .. 18. 
Restaurant 
.41 
.44 
.42 
Scene 
Classroom 
.48 
.51 
.S4 
that they differed only with respect to scene, F "" 35.08. The 
classroom scene was most accurately recalled, and it was also 
the scene that produced the most numerous emotional errors. 
(Similarly, the telephone scene produced the least accuracy, M = 
.37, and the fewest emotional errors.) Thus, based on analyses 
of average performance, emotional confusions did not depend 
on poor memory for actual dialogue. In addition, bivariate cor­
relations between the proportion of propositions recalled and the 
n�mbcr o� consistent emotional errors were not reliable. A neg­
atlve relaoon between the number of emotional errors and the 
number of propositions correctly recalled by each subject would 
have suggested that subjects filled in the gaps in their memories 
for utterances with descriptions of nonverbally portrayed emo­
tion. This was not the case. 
Mood and emotional e"ors. Next, we examined the associ­
ation of moods with corresponding emotional errors in recall. 
In separate multiple regression analyses of errors corresponding 
to eac� version of the scenes (e.g., errors reflecting disgust, in­
terest, JOY, and fear), we added ratings on the mood scales after 
a contrast code representing the transcript condition versus the 
relevant videotape condition. ln predicting fearful errors, for ex­
ample, the contrast code represented transcript versus Version 
2. The mood scales we used iu each analysis corresponded to 
the adjectives chosen by the pilot subjects for that version. For 
example, amused, curious, and interest£d were used to predict 
the numbet of emotional errors corresponding to the interest 
version of the restaurant scene. 
Four such analyses were performed, one for each type of emo­
tional error for the restaurant and classroom scenes. l n  only one 
case did the addition of the mood predictors reliably increase 
R2 over the variability due to viewing the videotape: When sub­
jects reported initial moods that were consistent with the fear 
version of the classroom scene, they tended to make more fearful 
errors in remembering that scene than could be predicted from 
knowledge that they had seen the fearful videotape, .F(3, 30) = 
3.48, MS ... = .182. This .19 increase in R2 contributed to an R2 
of .45 for the full equation, F(4, 29) "" 6.25, MS..,. = .507. 
Therefore, we found limited relations among moods reported 
at the start of the sessions and emotional errors in recall. s There 
are two possible reasons why these relations were so limited 
First, in contrast to the designs of most research on mood and 
memory, we used reports of natural moods and thereby limited 
the ranse of moods experienced by our subjects. Our subjects 
were not very insecure (M = 2.08) or distressed (M = 2.32), for 
example, but they tcnd.ed to be interested (M ... 5.30) and curious 
(M = 5.45). Second, only certain moods seemed to facilitate the 
interpretation of similar moods displayed by actors in our scenes 
(cf. Fe5hbach & Feshbach, 1968). Of course, it is not surprising 
that the successful scene in this regard depicted fear about going 
away to college; most of our subjects were first-�mester freshmen. 
In additional analyses of the mood data, we entered the contrast 
codes that represented acquisition conditions into equations that 
included the appropriate mood predictors, in order to discover 
if moods accounted for the differences we had attributed to non­
verbally communicated emotion. This use of mood covariates 
did not alter the previously described results. 
General Discussion 
ln summary, we emphasize that we have found evidence for 
confusions in melllory for what was said with how it was said, 
under a variety of processing and testing conditions, and that 
these confusions were independent of the viewers' moods. The 
effect of nonverbally communicated emotion on memory for 
utterances was demonstrated for most of our malerials. However, 
we cautiously note that the effect seems to depend on how con­
vincingly the emotions are portrc1yed and how well the viewers 
can identify with the situations. Also, the effects we did obtain 
were modest; in Experiment I, for example, recognition of the 
surface form of utterances was quite good, even after a week's 
delay. We have organized our discussion of the m<ijor outcomes 
of these experiments in relation to (a) conditions for processing 
emotion from nonverbal behavior, (b) the effects of misleading 
information on memory, and (c) models of mood and memory. 
Our results suggest that directed interpretations of the emo­
tional meaning of vocal tones and gestures are unnecessary in 
the production of later confusions in memory. Emotional errors 
occu.rred in a variety of conditions for processing nonverbal be­
haviors. In Experiment 1, the instructions that called attention 
to surface characteristics of nonverbal behaviors (number of ges­
tures and vocal pitch) produced similar numbers of consistent 
emotional errors as did those that demanded emotional inter­
pretations as part of the task. In Experiment 2, specific instruc­
tions regarding nonverbal behaviors were not provided. An in­
teresting possibility, then, is that interpretations of emotion au­
tomatically result from perceptions of nonverbal behavior. This 
poSii bility is consistent with the proposed biological basis for 
interpreting nonverbal behavior and findings that even very young 
children accurately identify emotion in facial expressions (Izard, 
1971, 1978; Plutchilc, 1980). However, this automaticity account 
is not demanded by our findings. It is quite possible that our 
subjects went beyond the instructions for the surface task in 
Experiment I and the processing task in Experiment 2 to con­
sciously construct meaning from nonverbal expressions. Clearly, 
further research to address thi, issue of automaticity must include 
a measure of conscious interpretation. 
The effects obtained in these experiments are similar to those 
obtAined in studies of reconstructive memory as a function of 
misleading information (e.g., Hertel, 1982; Loftus, Miller, & 
Bums, 1978; Spiro, 1980). However, the present experiments 
differ from these studies in our failure to find an increase over 
time in errors that reOect misleading information (nonverbally 
communicated emotion). The previous studies provided mis­
leading information temporally separate from the to-be-remem-
s Possible interactions between subject mood and version were also 
tested and found to be nonsigni6canL 
480 PAULA T. HERTEL AND ALICE NARVAEZ 
bered event, but our misleading information was temporally in­
tegrated with utterances. Therefore, changes in discrimination 
based on temporal cues could at least partially account for the 
increased error rate in their studies, while failing to play a role 
in the present experiments. 
An issue that is common among investigations of misleading 
information concerns the nature of its influence when memory 
for the original event is tested. Do errors reflecting misleading 
information (or nonverbally communicated emotion in this case) 
reflect integrative memory processes or do they merely show that 
the subject (a) has difficulty remembering the event, (b) remem­
bers the postevent bias (or nonverbal behavior), and (c) uses the 
latter to fill in the gaps during recall? In such a case as the latter, 
as we discussed earlier, we might observe a negative relation be­
tween errors and accuracy; in Experiment 2, there was none. 
Another way to examine the possibility that subjects were con­
fabulating is to ask them if they know that their emotional errors 
emanate from nonverbal expressions of meaning. 
At the end of the session in Experiment 2,  we asked subjects 
to indicate the nature of the emotion in each scene and whether 
it had been communicated verbally, nonverbally, or in both ways. 
Only 3 subjects attributed emotion to the nonverbal behaviors 
alone.6 Next, after telling them that emotions were communicated 
nonverbally, we asked subjects to judge whether these portrayals 
had affected their accuracy in recalling the utterances. They were 
allowed to review their protocols in making these judgments, 
and they indicated, to one degree or another, that they might 
have been influenced. However, no reliable correlations obtained 
between judged effects of emotion and the number of emotionally 
consistent errors. These self-reports, then, provide some addi­
tional support for the notion that confusions resulted from in­
tegrative memory processes, rather than from conscious attempts 
to fill in the gaps in memory for dialogue. 
Finally, we emphasize that models of mood and memory must 
address not only the influence of emotions experienced by the 
self, but the effects of emotions portrayed by others, as well. 
First, Experiment 2 provided evidence that moods reported by 
our subjects were correlated with recall errors that reflected fear 
or insecurity. Isen et al. ( 1978) and Bower ( 1981 )  have proposed 
models for understanding how the mood of the subject is related 
to qualitative aspects of memory performance, and our mood 
results are consistent with these explanations. However, by far 
the larger effects of emotions on memory performance in these 
studies were produced by the nonverbal behaviors of the actors, 
rather than by the moods of the audience. To account for these 
effects, models of mood and memory must provide for the ac­
tivation of emotion in memory by events unrelated to the self. 
Within Bower's ( 1 98 1 )  model, for example, interpretations of 
emotions that have been nonverbally communicated would seem 
to occur via the links from evoking appraisals and expressive 
behaviors to the emotion node. Expressive behaviors (the way 
we display emotions) are, of course, what we refer to as nonverbal 
behaviors. Bower described evoking appraisals as "standard 
evocative situations which when appraised lead to [an emotion]" 
(p. 1 35). Our scenes, for example, represent situations that typ­
ically evoke one set of emotions or another, as indicated by pilot 
ratings. Perhaps through a process of identification with the ac­
tors, these situations evoke emotions, even though the viewers 
are not directly experiencing them. The classroom scene, par-
ticularly the version representing fear, consistently produced 
emotional errors most frequently and, of course, going away to 
college is something that almost all of our subjects have expe­
rienced. 
' Five out of 36 subjects for the restaurant scene and 1 8  out of 36 for 
the classroom scene attributed emotions to the verbal utterances alone. 
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Appendix 
Questions for Cued Recall 
Instructions and questions for the restaurant and classroom 
scenes were as follows: 
For each of the following questions, please try to recall the 
gist of the utterance, plus as much of the exact wording as you 
can remember. 
Restaurant Scene 
What did the listener in the restaurant scene say 
1 .  When she first heard that David drove her friend home? 
2. About her friend staying with David? 
3. After her friend said that she had such a good time for the 
first time in months? 
4. When asked if her friend should tell Joe about the night 
before? 
Classroom Scene 
What did the student who was accepted to State University say 
about 
1. Leaving home to go to school? 
2. The courses in college? 
3. The sororities? 
4. Living in the dorms? 
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